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GUARANTEES AND THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

The object of this article is to consider, in the light of
recent English decisions, the application of the Statute of
Frauds to the contract of guarantee or suretyship,' and to
suggest some principles for a classification of the cases.
The statute, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, so far as is material to the
present subject, is as follows:
4. No action shall be brought . .
whereby to charge
the defendant upon any special promise to answer for the debt,
default or miscarriage of another person . . . unless the
agreement upon which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing and signed by the
party to be charged therewith, or some other person thereunto
by him lawfully authorized.
A guarantee fs: defined by de Colyar 2 as "a collateral
engagement to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage
of another person." The definition is obviously borrowed,
almost verbatim, from the Statute of Frauds-the word
"collateral" being substituted in the definition for the word
"special" in the statute. There is some advantage in borrowing the language of the statute, because the cases with
regard to the application of the statute involve an analysis
of the nature of the contract itself, and it simplifies the
terminology of the subject if, as far as possible, a guarantee
I In accordance with English and Ontario usage, the words "guarantor"
and "surety" will be treated as synonyms.
2 The Law of Guarantees and of Principal and Surety. 3rd ed. (1897). p. x.
(1)
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is so defined as to coincide with the promise mentioned in

the statute.
It is not, of course, intended to suggest that every contract of guarantee falls within the statute. There have been
many cases in which the contrary has been held. On the
other hand in many other cases it has been sought without
success to make the statute applicable to contracts which
are not guarantees. The cases fall into two main classes.
There are, firstly, certain promises which either are or include
true contracts of guarantee, that is, promises which give
rise to collateral liability on the promisor's part for the debt,
default or miscarriage of another person, but which have
been held on special grounds not to be within the statute.
Cases of this class form an exception to the general rule that
prima facie the statute applies to contracts of guarantee.
There are, secondly, certain promises which in some respects
resemble contracts of guarantee, but which really give rise
to original or principal liability on the promisor's part, and
are essentially not contracts of guarantee at all. Cases of
this class include the contract commonly called a contract
of indemnity,* as well as other contracts which do not comply with the essential requirements of a guarantee. The
failure to observe the fundamental distinction between these
two main classes of cases has sometimes resulted in confusing language in the reports.
The five rules stated in Halsbury's Laws of England,'
embodying in slightly revised form the rules stated in de
Colyar's earlier work,$ may conveniently be taken as the
basis of discussion.
These rules are as follows:
i. To bring a case within S. 4 of the Statute of Frauds, the
primary liability of another person or the promisee for the debt,
default or miscarriages to which the promise of guarantee relates
must exist or be coniemplated, otherwise the statute does not apply,
3 Cf. Harburg India Rubber Comb Co. v. Martin,
784, 792.
SVol. x5, pp. 458 ff.
'Op. cit.. pp. 65, 66.

(1902) I K.

B. at pp.
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and the promise is then valid, and can be sued on, though not in
writing.6
2. The statute does not apply to any promise-to be answerable
for another, unless such promise is made to the creditor, that is
to say, to the person to whom another is already, or is thereafter
to become, liable, and who can enforce such liability by action. 7
3. The statute does not apply to any case, unless there is an
absence of all liability on the part of the promisor (the surety),
or of his property, except such as arises from his own express
promise. s
4. The main or immediate object of the agreement between
the parties must, to bring a case within the statute, be to secure
the payment of a debt, or the fulfillment of a duty bya third party.'
5. Whenever the transaction between the promisor and the
creditor, to whom the promise is made, amounts to a sale or surrender by the latter, to or for the benefit of the former, of a security
for the debt of another or of the debt itself, the statute does not
apply. 10

I. Of the five rules, I propose for the moment to pass
over the first two and to confine my discussion to the last
three. Rules 3, 4 and 5 relate to one phrase of the subject
and may be considered together.
In order to emphasize the relation between these three
rules I suggest the following restatement of them:
A promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of
another person is prima facie within the Statute of Frauds, but
by way of exception the statute does not apply to an agreement
between the surety and the creditor if the promise by the former
to the latter to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another person is merelyione incident of the agreement, which has
some other main or immediate object;
And, in particular, the statute does not apply (i) if, when
the promise is made, there already exists any liability on the part
of the promisor (the surety) or of his property except such as arises
from his own express promise, or
(2) if the transaction between the promisor (the surety) and
the promisee (the creditor) amounts to a sale or surrender by the
latter to or for the benefit of the former of a security of the debt
of another or of the debt itself.
This restatement is intended to show on its face that
the general rule is that which requires, in the case of a prom4Halsbury, op. dl., vol. i5, par 889; De Colyar, op. cit., p. 65, rule x.

71Halsbury, op. cit., vol. iS, par. 891; De Colyar, op. cit., p. 66, rule 2.
2 Halsbury-, op. cit., vol. ix, par. 892; De Colyar, op. cit., p. 66, rule 3,
omits "or of his property," and inserts "or interest" after the word "liability."
10Halsbury, op. cit., vol. 15, par. 893; De Colyar, op. cit., p. 66, rule 4.
Halsbury, op. cit., vol. zS, par. 894; De Colyar, op. cit.j p. 66, rule 5.
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ise falling within the statute, that the main or the immediate
object of the agreement between the parties shall be the
answering for another. It is also intended to suggest that
the subsidiary rules are merely particular examples of the
general rule--examples which may to some extent serve as
a guide in determining the scope of the general rule.
An instructive modern case on the question when a
contract of guarantee is not within the Statute of Frauds
is that of Harburg India Rubber Comb Co. v. Martin."
The plaintiff had recovered judgment in an action
against the Crowdus Accumulator Syndicate and had placed
a writ of fierifacias in the sheriff's hands, upon which however he had failed to realize, the syndicate's place of business
being closed and the works being stopped. After this the
defendant Martin orally promised the plaintiff's agent to
endorse two bills of exchange, each for one-half the judgment debt, payable at three and six months after date respectively, and on the faith of this promise the plaintiff
withdrew the writ. The present action was brought for
breach of the defendant's promise.
The defendant was the largest shareholder in the syndicate, and was therefore in a popular sense interested in
its property, but he had nothing in the way of a charge'.
upon the property and in a legal sense had no interest in
the goods which were about to be seized under the plaintiff's
execution, when the promise was made. The plaintiff's
counsel argued "forcibly and ably" that although the defendant had no legal right to or interest in the goods he had
an interest in them in a business sense, but the court held
that the "interest" required to take the case out of the
statute must be an interest which the law recognizes.
It was also argued that the object of the defendant's
promise was really to secure a benefit for himself and not
to secure forbearance for the syndicate, but the court would
not agree with this argument. "It seems to me," says
1U
2 (1902) 1

infra.

K. B. 778.
As to the effect if the defendant had had a charge, see Davys v. Buswell.
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Cozens-Hardy, M. R., "to involve a confusion between
object and motive. I cannot doubt that the object of the
promise which was made by the defendant was to secure the
forbearance of the plaintiff, for three months and six months,
in enforcing the debt due from the Syndicate." In order
to see what is the object of a contract in a legal sense, we
must look at the contract itself and see what is its subject
matter, and not at the defendant's motive for entering into
the contract.
An Ontario case, somewhat similar to Harburg v. Martin
is that of Young v. Milne.3 The plaintiff had issued
execution against the Lentz Lumber Co. Before anything
was done under the writ, the defendant (according to the
evidence of the plaintiff's solicitor) offered to pay $250 on
account and to pay the balance in four weeks provided the
execution was withdrawn. The sum of $250 was paid by
the check of the company and the plaintiff withdrew the
execution. The defendant denied having made any promise
that he himself would pay. The action was dismissed.
Boyd C. at p. 368 said, "The confusion of evidence and
recollection exemplifies the value of the rule of law which
requires that the promise to pay the debt of another should
be manifested in writing. The sole question is, does this
promise, even giving credit to the solicitor's version, fall
within the Statute of Frauds, which is pleaded. The authorities are, according to the latest exposition, in favor of the
defendant. When the plaintiff, in consideration of the promise to pay, has relinquished an execution under which some
advantage or security exists or is likely to be realized, and
when the effect of the relinquishment is that such interest
or advantage accrues to the defendant who has made the
promise, then no writing is required, for the transaction is
substantially one for the purchase of the execution. But
if the promise is given in consideration of a promise of forbearance for a time, and the execution is, as here, withdrawn,
yet, as no direct benefit therefrom has arisen to or was con(19xo), 20 0. L. R. 366.
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templated by the promisor, it is simply a promise to pay the
debt of another, which is valid enough as far as the consideration is concerned, but is not enforceable because not put
in writing. The execution against the Lentz Company is
still outstanding and enforceable and that company is liable
for this judgment debt."
Modern judicial commendation of the Statute of Frauds
is not common, and undoubtedly the statute helps to mar
the uniformity of the English law of contract, which in most
cases enforces the formless agreement. The judgment last
quoted from, is therefore noteworthy in the suggestion it
gives of. a justification for the particular statutory provision
now in question. Street"1 has indeed pointed out that
the collateral promise of guarantee-like the promise of an
executor personally to pay the- debts of the estate of which
he is executor-may well be subjected to restrictions in the
way of proof. In the case of a promise under the second
clause of the fourth section of the Statute of Frauds, as
well as in the case of a promise under the first clause, the
defendant is asked to pay something which is not in itself
chargeable to him, but the same cannot be said of the other
clauses of the statute. In the ordinary simple contract
where the promisor is bound by a good consideration and
himself gets the benefit of the contract, there is no reason
for requiring written evidence-especially since the parties
may now give evidence on their own behalf. The thing
delivered or the act done or the counterpromise given is
generally capable of easy proof, and the claim is not more
likely to be bolstered up by perjury, than any other cause of
action. In suretyship (as in the case of the executor), on the
other hand, the liability of the defendant is founded wholly
upon the alleged promise, and he cannot usually protect
himself against a misrepresentation of language by an appeal
to the facts out of which the main liability grew. The surety
may be held merely upon proof that the sale was made at
his instance and on his credit or that he promised to pay
14

Foundations of Legal Liability (i9o6), vol. 2, pp. 183, 188- 9 .
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if the purchaser should not. Vhen the guarantee is given
after the sale a new consideration is indeed necessary, but it
may consist of a real or pretended forbearance on the part of
the vendor. It is therefore not unreasonable that writing
should be required in the ordinary case of a guarantee, but
the reason ceases to exist when it is proved that the guarantee
is merely subsidiary to a larger contract or is merely incidental to another object which itself is the real subject matter
of the defendant's promise.
The reason underlying the statute is clearly stated, in
language which need not be quoted here, by the Supreme
Court of the United States in Davis v. Patrick,"5 in which
it is pointed out that the reason for the statute fails in a
case in which
"the promisor has a personal, immediate, and pecuniary interest
in the transaction, and is therefore himself a party to be benefited
by the performance of the promise."
As was said by the same court in the earlier case of
Emerson v. Slater,"
"Whenever the main purpose and object of the promisor
is not to answer for another, but to subserve some pecuniary or
business purpose of his own, involving either a benefit to himself
or damage to the other contracting party, his promise is not within
the statute, although it may be in form a promise to pay the debt
of another, and although the performance of it may incidentally
have the effect of exting.uishing that liability."
It is only with the greatest diffidence that a Canadian
lawyer should question the correctness of dicta of members
of the Supreme Court of the United States, and I should
hesitate to do so at all if I could not appeal for support to
judges and writers.
The two passages above quoted are, however, open to
criticism in view of what seems to be the better view of the
scope and meaning of the Statute of Frauds. The passage
quoted from Emerson v. Slater in particular has, as is well
known, been made the basis of many subsequent judgments
's(1891) 141 U. S. 479, Ames' Cases on Suertyship, 89.

vations as to this case, infra.
26 (1859) 22 HOW. 28, at p. 43.

See further obser-
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in state courts, and as so applied has, it is respectfully submitted, had the effect of taking out of the statute many a

case which should have been held to be within the statute.
Even if it is admitted that the state courts have given
a wider meaning to the passage in question than was intended by the Supreme Court, it would seem that the language of the Supreme Court lends itself to misinterpretation
when read apart from the limitations stated in the decided
cases upon which it is based." The statement that a promise
is not within the statute
"if the main purpose and object of the promisor is not to answer
for another, but to subserve some pecuniary or business purpose
of his own, involving either a benefit to himself or damage to the
other contracting party."

seems too vague in its reference to the "pecuniary or business
purpose" of the promisor to be subserved by the making of
the promise, and tends to encourage that confusion between
object and motive which was condemned in the judgment
in Harburg v. Martin, supra. The form of the reference to

the benefit to the promisor or the detriment to the promisee
is also open to criticism because it suggests, without actually
authorizing, the doctrine that the statute does not apply
if there is a new consideration, distinct from the debt, moving
between the creditor and the surety.U'
There are of course judgments in the reports in favor of

the last mentioned doctrine,' which, as Browne says, by
its too free and unqualified assertion, has done much to
darken and complicate the law upon this branch of the
7

It is not quite clear that the Supreme Court itself bore these limitations
sufficiently in mind.
1SMy excuse for referring at all to the last mentioned doctrine is that in
its effect it is hardly to be distinguished from the doctrine that a case is taken
out of the statute by the fact that the promisor's object is to benefit himself.
If one doctrine is erroneous, the other is equally erroneous unless it is subjected
to some fairly definite limitations.
2

" See, e. g., the English cases referred to in De Colyar, OP. cit., p. 132.

Some of the heretical American judgments, especially in the state of
are based upon a dictum of Kent, C. J. (afterwards Chancellor) in
Vredenburgh (18x) 8 Johns. 29, which was not necessary to the
the case. Cf. Brandt, Suretyship and Guaranty, 3rd ed., E8o. As
sequent development of the doctrine in New York, see also

20

New York,
Leonard v.
decision of
to the sub-

CyC. 88 ff.; Mal-

lory v. Gillett (186o) 21 N.i Y. 412, Ames' Cases on Suretyship, 76; Prime v.
Koehler (1879) 77 N. Y. 9 , Ames' Cases on Suretyship, 87; White v. Rentoul
(1888) xo8 N. Y. 222.
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statute.

Some of the judgments in which the doctrine

has been stated can, it is true, be supported on other grounds,
but the doctrine itself has the effect of making a dead letter
of the statute in many cases of promises to pay the preexisting debt of a third party.21 It has been vigorously
condemned in various cases, and it seems clear that in order
to take a case out of the statute there must be some element
other than a new consideration moving between the creditor
and the surety.2'
It is a still more obviously insufficient ground for excluding the operation of the statute that there is a new
consideration moving between the debtor and the promisor,2
but the case of the debtor transferring property to the
promisor to be applied by the latter in payment of the creditor is of course in a different category.-'
It is therefore important to ascertain the real scope of
the exceptions from the operation of the statute indicated
by the three rules with which we are immediately concerned,2' and for this purpose it is instructive to consider the
specific classes of cases in which a promise which involves the
answering for another has been held to be outside the statute.
These cases have been conveniently sub-divided into
the "property cases," the "document cases" and the "dd
crdere cases.""6
(A) The Propeily Cases.
The leading case is Fitzgerald v. Dressier."1 A sold
goods to B, A retaining possession by virtue of his vendor's
lien. B afterwards sold the same goods to C. C was under
"A Treatise on the Construction of the Statute of Frauds, 5th ed. (895)
§i68, p. 214. In §§2o7 f. the learned author discusses the doctrine very fully.
SBrowne. op. cit., §207, p. 266.
2 See, e. g., Fullam v. Adams (x864) 37 Vt. 391; Maule v. Bucknell (1865)
5o Pa. St. 39; Ames v. Foster (1871) io6 Mass 4oo, Ames! Cases on Suretyship,
85; Bailey v. Gillies (1902) 4 0. L. R. 182, at p. i9o.
2 Furbish v. Goodnow (x867) 98 Mass. 296, Ames' Cases on Suretyship, 33.
21See Williams v. Leper (1766) 3 Burr. 1886, Ames' Cases on Suretyship,
72, discussed below.
21 That is, De Colyar's third, fourth and fifth rules which I endeavored
to restate towards the beginning of this paper.
26 Cf. Cozens-Hardy, M. P_ in Harburg v. Martin (i9O2) x K. B. 778,
at pp. 792-3.
2 (1859) 7 C. B. N. S. 374.
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terms. to pay B for the goods before the time fixed for payment by B-to A. In-prder to induce A to hand over the
goods before the time fixed for payment by B, C orally
promised A,that B should pay on the day named. A accordingly gave- up possession of the goods. It was .held
that the promise, was not within the statute. "At tle time
the
promisewas
was made," says Williams, J., at p. 394, "the
defendant
substantially the owner of the linseed,
in
question, which was subject to the'lien of the originalvendors
for the contract price. The effect of the promise was neither
more nor less than this, to get rid of- the incumbrance,. or,
in other words, to buy off the plaintiff's lien. That being
so, it seems to me that the authorities clearly establish that
such a case is not within the statute."
Cockburn, C. J._, in the same case" quotes with approval
from Williams'. notes to Forth v..Stanton;' as fllows:
"There is considerable- difficulty in the subject, occasioned

by- unguarded expressions in the reports of the different cases;
but the fair" reskilt seems to be, that the question, whether any
particuilar case comes within this clause of the statute or not, depends, not on-the consideration for the promise,, but on the fact
of the original party remaining liable, coupled -with the absence of
any liability on the part of the defendant or his property, except
such as arises from his express promise." '
Cockburn, C. J.'s approval of the passage just quoted
was expressed to be conditional upon the concluding words
being considered an integral -part of the proposition, that
is to say, that in order to take the case out of the statute
the zproperty which is the subject of the defendant's undertaking must be in point of fact his own or must be property
in which he has some interest.
Enphasis was laid upon the same point, and perhaps a
disposition to restrict this exception from the operation of
the statute was shown, in the more recent case of Davys-v.
Buswell.30 The defendant counterclaimed upon a promise
by the plaintiff to lie answerable for the price of goods supP
.
N. S. 374, at p. 392.
2 (1668) i Wms.Saunders, 214 _e(p. 233, ed.'1871).
C. B
'7

3,(1913) 2 K. B. 47.
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plied by the defendant to a limited company. The defendant
had been supplying goods to the company, but there being
a balance owing he had refused to supply any more goods
until this balance was paid. The plaintiff then made an
oral promise, the effect of which, according to the finding
of the jury, was that the plaintiff agreed to pay if the company made default. The jury also found that the plaintiff
was induced to enter into this agreement by the fact (inter
alia) that he had a debenture charge upon the assets of the
company.31
It had been pointed out by Stirling, C. J., in Harburg v.
Martin' 2 that the defendant in that case had nothing in
the way of a charge on the property of the syndicate and
therefore no "interest" in the legal sense in the goods which
were about to be seized under the plaintiff's execution.
Apparently with special regard to the implication to be
drawn from Stirling, C. J.'s judgment that if the promisor
had a legal charge upon the property of the company the
promise would be enforceable although there was no Writing,
Lord Coleridge, j., in Davys v. Buswell held that the case
was taken out of the statute by the promisor's interest in
the company's property. This decision was reversed by the
Court of Appeal, virtually on the ground that this case, like
Harburg :v. Martin, was not analogous to the "property
cases," in which a per 6n who has purchased or has an interest in certain goods which are subject to a lien obtains
a discharge of the lien by undertaking to be responsible for
payment of the debt in respect to which the lien exists. The
motive of Davys in making the promise was doubtless to
improve his own position, because if more goods were supplied to the company the value of the property covered by
his charge in the event of the winding up of the company
would be greater, but the object of the promise was simply
to guarantee the company's debt.
Fitzgerald v. Dressler was a clear case of a promise the
object and effect of which was to free specific goods, the
1This charge was of the kind known as a "floating" charge, but nothing
turned on the fact that the charge was an equitable, not a legal, charge.
32(1902)

1 K. B. 778, at p. 791.
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property of the promisor, from a lien, and which was therefore not primarily a promise to answer for another. The
courts in England have, however, refused to extend the
exception from the application of the statute to a case in
which the promisor had merely an interest in a business sense
as chief shareholder of the principal debtor (Harburg v.
Martin), or even to a case in which the promisor had a general debenture charge upon the assets of the principal debtor
(Davys v. Buswell). Strictly in accordance with the doctrine of the English cases it was held in Massachusetts that
the statute -applied in a case in which the owners of a ship
were indebted to the plaintiffs for wood and coal supplied,
and when the plaintiffs threatened to attach the ship, the
defendant, a mortgagee of a three-fourths share in the ship,
promised to pay the bill if the plaintiff would not attach
the ship. s '
It is interesting to compare these cases, especially that
of Davys v. Buswell, with the case of Davis v. Patrick,s4
already mentioned, decided by the Supreme Court of the
United States. A comparison of the cases seems to indicate
a divergence between the view of that court and the most
recently expressed views of the English Court of Appeal.
The latter court seems to be inclined to draw the line more
strictly in excepting cases from the operation of the statute.
In Davis v. Patrick the promisor had bought from the principal debtor and had paid for a large quantity of ore. The
object of his promise was in part at least to secure the transportation and delivery to him of this ore, his own property.
So far as the judgment against him was based on this ground
it is unexceptionable-the case falling clearly within the
"property cases." In the judgment, however, much stress
is laid also on the circumstance that the promisor was a
creditor of the principal debtor with some measure of control over the mine operated by the principal debtor, and it
is said that the object and effect of the promise was to help
,3 Ames v. Foster (1871) io6 Mass.

400,

Ames' Cases on Suretyship, 85.

34(1891) 141 U. S. 479, Ames' Cases on Suretyship, 89.
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the principal debtor to pay its debt to the promisor, because
the payment of the debt depended upon the continued and
successful working of the mine. In other words the dicta
referred to seem to recognize as valid the argument which
was condemned in Harburg v. Martin and Davys v. Buswell,
namely, that it is sufficient, in order to take a case out of
the statute, that the promisor should have an interest in a
merely business sense in the property of the principal debtor..
The Pennsylvania case of Goodling v. Simon,- seems
to be inconsistent with the English cases. The plaintiffs
were holders of a note made by a company,-of which the
defendants were shareholders and creditors, as well as being
respectively president and treasurer. The plaintiffs having
threatened suit on the note, the defendants promised to
pay the plaintiff's claim upon condition that the plaintiffs
would not proceed further against the company. It was
held that the promise was not within the statute, on the
ground that the main object of the promise was not to answer
for the debt of another but to further and protect the defendant's own interests, by enabling them to dispose of their
individual interests in the company, which to the knowledge
of all the parties to the suit was insolvent.
In the earlier Pennsylvania cases cited in the judgment
in Goodling v. Simon, i there is manifest the same inclination
to except from the operation of the statute any promise made
for the purpose of subserving the promisor's own interests,
without imposing any such strict limitation upon the exception as has been imposed by the English cases.
In the interval between the decision in Harburg v.
Martin and that in Davys v. Buswell, the Ontario case of
Adams v. Craig and the Ontario Bank36 was decided. The
defendant Craig made a sale of goods with a view of reducing
his overdraft with the defendant bank. Included in these
goods were certain goods contracted to be purchased by
him from the plaintiff, and in order to obtain the plaintiff's
3' (1913) 54 Pa. Superior Ct.
36 (19L 1) 24 0. L. R. 490.

125.
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acquiescence in the sale, an oral promise was made on behalf
of the bank that upon the sale being completed and the
purchase money being placed to the credit of Craig, the
bank would pay the amount of a cheque drawn by Craig
upon the bank in the plaintiff's favour. It was held that
the circumstances brought the promise within the "property cases" and that the bank was liable upon the oral promise to pay the cheque. It seems, however, doubtful whether
the decision is consistent with the strict view of the "property cases" adopted in Davys v. Buswell, unless indeed the
transaction may be regarded as being a purchase of the goods
by the bank from the plaintiff in order that they might be
sold by Craig together with his own goods.
(b) The Document Cases.
The clearest direct authority on this class of cases is
Castling v. Aubert.3? The plaintiff, a broker, had effected
certain policies of insurance for his principal, and had a lien
thereon in respect to bills of exchange accepted by the plaintiff
for the accommodation of the principal. A loss occurred
under the policies, and the defendant, in order that he might
collect on behalt of the principal the amount due from the
underwriters, promised the plaintiff to provide for the payment of the acceptances as they became due, upon the plaintiff giving up to him the policies. The plaintiff sustained
damages by the breach of the defendant's promise. The
defendant having collected on the policies a larger amount
than the plaintiff's claim, it was held that the plaintiff was
entitled to recover on the count for money had and received,
but it was also held that the defendant's promise was not
within the statute, the transaction rather being a purchase
by the defendant of the securities which the plaintiff held
in his hands. This, as Lord Ellenborough, C. J., observed, '
was "quite outside the mischief provided against by the
statute; which was that persons should not by their own
unvouched undertaking without writing charge themselves
27 (1802) 2 East 325.
33 2 East 325, at p. 331.
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for the debt, default or miscarriage of another." Lawrence,
J., says,39 "This is to be considered as a purchase by the
defendant of the plaintiff's interest in the policies. It is
not a bare promise to the creditor to pay the debt of another
due to him, but a promise by the defendant to pay what
the plaintiff would be liable to pay (i. e., the acceptances),
if the plaintiff would furnish him with the means of doing so."
The "document cases" are discussed by Cozens-Hardy,
M. R., in Harburg v. MartinO as being entirely distinct
from the "property cases," but Vaughan Williams, L. J.'s
definition of the latter, already noted, clearly include the
former, and the advantage of making two classes is doubtful.
The defendant's promise is either a contract for the release
of property which is his own or in which he has an interest
or a contract for the purchase of property.
(c) The Del Credere Cases.
A contract for the employment of a del credere agent
need not be in writing, although it incidently involves the
answering for the debt, default or miscarriage of another
person.
The leading case in England is that of Couturier v.
Hastie."1 Parke, B., delivering the judgment of the Court
of Exchequer, said,42 "The other and only remaining point
is, whether the defendants are responsible by reason of their
charging a del credere commission, though they have not
guaranteed by writing signed by themselves. XVe think they
are. Doubtless, if they had for a percentage guaranteed
the debt owing, or performance of the contract by the vendee,
being totally unconnected with the sale, they would not be
liable without a note in writing signed by them; but being
the agents to negotiate the sale, the commission is paid in
respect of that employment; a higher reward is paid in consideration of their taking greater care in sales to their cus'2East 325, at p. 332.
K. B. 778, at p. 793Exch. 40, reversed on other grounds, 9 Exch. io2. 5 H. L. C.

4o (19o2) 1
41 (1852) 8

673. 48 Exch.

40,

at pp. 55, 56.
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tomers, and precluding all question whether the loss arose
from negligence or not, and also for assuming a greater share
of responsibility than ordinary agents, namely, responsibility
for the solvency and performance of their contracts by their
vendees.
This is the main object of the reward being given to
them; and though it may terminate in a liability to pay the
debt of another, that is not the immediate object for which
the consideration is given, and the case resembles in this
respect those of Williams v. Leper,1 and Castling v. Aubert."
We entirely adopt the reasoning of an American judge (Mr.
Justice Cowen) in a very able judgment on this very point
in Wolff v. Koppel."4s
The principle of Couturier v. Hastie was applied and
6
possibly extended in the case of Sutton & Co. v. Grey."
The plaintiffs, who were stockbrokers, entered into an oral
agreement with the defendant, who was not a member of
the stock exchange, that he should introduce clients to them,
and that the plaintiffs should transact business on the exchange for the clients thus introduced, upon the terms that,
as between the plaintiffs and the defendant, the defendant
should receive one-half of the commission earned by the
plaintiffs in respect of any transactions for such clients, and
that the defendant should pay to the plaintiffs one-half of
any loss which might be incurred by them in respect of such
transactions. The plaintiffs sued the defendant for one-half
of the loss incurred in transactions entered into on behalf
of one of the clients introduced by the defendant. It was
held that the Statute of Frauds did not apply because the
defendant had an equal interest in the transaction with the
plaintiffs, or, alternatively, because the main object of the
agreement was not to guarantee payment of the debt of
another, but to regulate the terms of the defendant's employment by the plaintiffs. It was not strictly the case of
43 (1766)

3 Burr. 1886, Ames' Cases on Suretyship,
East 325.

4 (1802) 2

72.

45(1843) 5 Hill 453, Ames' Cases on Suretyship. 67.
" (1894) 1 Q. B. 285. Ames' Cases on Suretyship, 70.
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the employm'ent of a del credere agent nor was it strictly a
partnership, but it was held that the principle of the de
credere cases applied.
It will be observed that when the del credere cases were
in Couturier v. Hastie first decided not to be within the
statute, the ground given for the decision was the broadest
principle applicable to the circumstances-a principle amply
broad enough to cover the somewhat different circumstances
of Sutton & Co. v. Grey-broad enough also to cover the
very different circumstance of the other cases previously
discussed. As pointed out by Vaughan Williams, L. J.,
in Harburg v. Martin,17 the property cases (including the
document cases) and the del credere cases are cases of different
species, but all members of one genus. In each of these
cases there is a main contract-a larger contract-and the
obligation to pay the debt of another is merely an incident
of the larger contract. It is not a question of motive-it is
a question of object. The question in each case is, what is
the subject matter of the contract? If the subject matter is
the purchase of property, the getting rid of an encumbrance,
the securing of greater diligence in the performance of the
duty of a factor, or the introduction of business into a stockbroker's office-in all these cases there is a larger matter
which is the object of the contract. The mere fact that as
an incident to that contract-not as the immediate object,
but indirectly-the debt of another person will be paid, does
not bring the case within the statute. The form of the
promise isnot conclusive. Whether the promisor in terms
engages to answer for the debt of another or not, it is the
substance, not the form which is to be regarded. The statute
applies only to a "special" promise to answer for the debt,
default or miscarriage of another person, that is, a promise
specially directed to this end. It does not apply to a promise
made with some other main or immediate object.
The case of Williams v. Leper, 48 cited in the judgment
of Parke, B., in Couturier v. Hastie, is a good illustration of
i K. B. 778, at pP. 784, 786.
43 (1766) 3 Burr. i886, Ames' Cases on Suretyship, 72.
47(902)
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the broad principle. One Taylor, a tenant of the plaintiff,
being in arrear for rent and insolvent, conveyed all his effects
for the benefit of his creditors. They employed the defendant
to sell the effects and accordingly he advertised the sale.
On the morning advertised for the sale, the plaintiff came to
distrain the goods in the house. The defendant having
notice of the plaintiff's intention to distrain, promised to
pay the arrears of rent if he would desist from distraining,
and the plaintiff did thereupon desist. It was held that
the promise was not within the Statute of Frauds.
Wilmot, J. considered the distress as being actually
made, and said that the defendant made the promise to
discharge the goods. That is only another way of saying
that the object of the promise was not to answer for the debt
of another, but to protect the goods of the creditors for whom
the defendant was trustee, and this seems to be the simplest
and broadest ground upon which the decision can be based."
It is only a particular application of the broader principle to say that the defendant was liable on his promise
because he was virtually a purchaser of the goods * or because he had an interest in the goods apart from his promisell or because his liability did not arise wholly out of his
express promise.62 But if there is no actual right of distress
at the time the promise is made, as-for instance where the
promise is made in respect of future rent,' the case is within
the statute--not being within the exception based on the
general principle as broadly stated, or any of its particular
applications.
Lord Mansfield in Williams v. Leper based his decision
on the ground that the defendant was trustee for all the
creditors and therefore obliged to pay the landlord who had
the prior lien. This is not a promise to pay the debt of
J. in Harburg v. Martin (igo2) i K B. 778, at p. 779.
60 De Colyar, Law of Guarantees, 3rd ed. i6o.
1 De Colyar, op. ciL, 138.
-See Stirling L. J. in Harburg v. Martin, ubi supra, at p. 790, treating
Williams v. Leper as a type of one of the classes of cases falling within the general principle that if the promisor or his property is already liable to the promisee. the promise is not within the statute.
Thomas v. Williams (3830) 3o B. & C. 664, Lord Tenterden, at p. 670.
4 Cf. Mathew,
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another. Wilmot, J., said that the defendant was in the
nature of a bailiff for the landlord, and, if the defendant had
sold the goods and received money for them, an action for
money had and received for the plaintiff's use would have
lain. In this connection it is to be noted that Aston, J.
thought that if the goods had not sold for so much as the
plaintiff's rent, the defendant would be liable for no more than
they sold for.
De Colyar54 cites Williams v. Leper as one of the class
of cases which may be considered referable to the principle
that the statute applies only where there is a principal debtor,
and in particular as an illustration of the principle that a
promise made to a third person's creditors to pay the debt
of that third person out of the proceeds of a sale of that third
person's goods is not within the statute.&& Such a promise
is not a promise to answer for the debt of another person,
but a promise to answer for the sufficiency of a certain fund,
or for the due application of the fund, as the case may be.
In such a case you uidertake or promise not for another, but
for yourself. You undertake, not that another shall pay out
of the proceeds of the sale, but that you yourself will do so.
Consequently, there is no one liable, or to become liable,
in the first instance, to do that which you promise or undertake to do, and therefore the operation of the statute is
excluded. This belongs,i however, to the second main class
of cases, which I propose next to discuss.
John Delatre Falconbridge.
(To be continued.)
"

op. cit., pp. 78-81.
Dock v. Boyd & Co. (88o) 93 Pa. 4o ,Ames' Cases on Suretyship, 40.
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